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To what extent differences across developing countries in their domestic tax mobilization can be 
explained, in addition to the traditional determinants, by political economy factors and particularly by 
the political regime? Using a panel of 66 developing countries over the period 1990-2005, this paper 
provides econometric evidence that democracy matters for achieving higher domestic tax revenues 
which  are  much  needed  to  finance  public  goods.  It  is  especially  the  level  of  constraints  on  the 
executive  which  is  of  importance  to  counter  the  government's  propensity  to  cave  in  for  special 
interests  and  to  be  insufficiently  welfare  minded.  We  found  that  high  levels  of  democracy  are 
specifically needed in natural resource rich countries to make natural resource rents contribute to 
higher domestic tax revenues and no longer be an impediment to a sustained tax system. 
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1 
1 – Introduction 
 
Coordinated  tax-tariff  reforms  in  developing  countries  favour  a  decrease  in  tariffs  to  enhance 
efficiency with an increase in domestic taxation in order to maintain enough revenue to finance public 
goods.  However,  for  many  developing  countries,  this  revenue  substitution  is  difficult.  According  to 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2009), in low income countries, for one dollar of loss from tariffs, only thirty cents 
were recovered from domestic taxation (direct taxes - taxes on income and profit - and domestic indirect 
taxes - value-added/sales taxes and excises). A sustained tax system able to generate higher domestic tax 
revenue in developing countries is needed in order to finance much needed public goods.
1 Moreover, 
developing countries are really in need of increased domestic tax revenues since the 66 countries in our 
sample collected on average over the period 1990-2005, only about 10% of GDP from domestic taxation 
while international trade taxes are falling. However, tax reforms and enhanced mobilization can only be 
achieved when there is a strong political will and leadership to adopt the necessary measures. The slow 
increase in domestic tax mobilization might therefore be due to political economy factors which should be 
taken  into  consideration.  As  far  as  trade  taxes  are  concerned,  it  is  well  established  in  theory  and  in 
empirical work that trade policy decisions are used by governments of both developed and developing 
countries to favour special interest groups, making a trade off between welfare and rents.
2 The importance 
of political economy factors in the developing countries' domestic tax decisions has however been less 
studied. Nonetheless, experiences in these countries let us think that they may play a huge role. Indeed, 
governments could be tempted to protect specific sectors by enacting non-neutral VAT and excises or by 
according  exemptions  to  some  interest  groups  or  to  set  the  VAT  threshold  at  a  particular  level
3  for 
example thus leading to significantly less tax revenues. Similarly, reforms of the direct taxes on personal 
income are often delayed due to interest groups pressures  
Given this background, the contribution of this paper is to show that if political economy factors 
matter in domestic tax policies they can be accommodated by increased democracy. We thus examine 
whether the type of political regime in place, with all its inherent features, is relevant for explaining the 
performance of domestic tax revenues in developing countries. In the presence of a weak system of checks 
and balances and if powerful economic elites control the political process, the government might be less 
                                                 
1 This is consistent with the tax-spend hypothesis (Friedman, 1978), revenue causing expenditure, empirically 
confirmed for some developing countries by Narayan and Narayan (2006). 
2 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994), Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Cadot et al. (2003). 
3 In Uganda, for instance, the near-failure of the VAT introduced in 1995 was quelled in large part by rapidly 
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2 
welfare minded and it may be easier to grant favours to special interests. Only few studies used the 
components of democracy indicators to distinguish which aspect of democracy is of importance, we will 
therefore  examine  which  component  of  democracy  is  necessary  to  ensure  higher  domestic  tax 
mobilization. Another research question is, in which kind of countries, this positive effect of democracy 
would especially be needed to build a sustained tax system? Given the fact that the presence of high 
natural resource rents in the beginning of the period undeniably creates soft budget constraints which serve 
to delay the tax policy changes needed, one may wonder whether more democratic institutions in natural 
resource-rich  countries  could  make  these  natural  resource  rents  contribute  to  higher  domestic  taxes 
revenues and no longer be an obstacle to a sustained tax system. 
It is of paramount importance to explain the design of taxation policies and identify what is relevant to 
limit tax mobilization impediments. If democracy appears to be also important for domestic tax revenues, 
because democratic regimes respond less to special interests, the wave of democratization in developing 
countries since the 90's might help countries to achieve higher tax revenues. Political economy factors can 
be taken into account by policy makers who should communicate on the consequences of the reform in 
order to reduce the uncertainty and garner a sufficient number of groups in favour of the domestic tax 
reform.  
Institutional  factors  as  determinants  of  tax  revenue  in  developing  countries  have  been  taken  into 
consideration by some authors. Gupta (2007) shows that corruption is a significant determinant of tax 
revenues.  Bird  et  al.  (2008)  postulate  that  if  taxpayers  both  perceive  that  their  interests  are  properly 
represented in political institutions and that the governance is good, their willingness to contribute by 
paying taxes increases. Using cross-section data, they find that corruption and voice and accountability 
play a significant role in the determination of developing and transition countries tax effort. Cheibub 
(1998) studied in 108 developed and developing countries over the period 1970-1990 whether the infant 
democracies will be as able as autocracies to collect taxes. The use of a discrete measure of political 
regime is quite limiting but he found that there are no grounds for believing that democracies are any less 
able than dictatorships to extract resources from society through taxation. Our study is in the continuity of 
this research field but sheds a light on the detrimental presence of interest groups for domestic taxes that 
could be accommodated by democracy. We use a continuous measure for political regime to test the 
importance of the political regime, with its inherent features, for domestic tax performance showing that 
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3 
special  interest  groups.  We  also  add  to  the  literature  by  focusing  on  which  aspect  of  democracy  is 
important and in which countries it is especially needed. Contrary to Bird et al. (2008) the focus will not 
be on the increased citizen's willingness to pay due to good governance but on the presence of political 
economy factors with interest groups seeking less taxation. The above mentioned papers mainly studied 
the total tax revenue, mixing the growing domestic taxes and the declining taxes on international trade. We 
will only focus here on the domestic part of the tax performance reflecting properly the country's political 
will. Moreover, we treat the political regime as being endogenous to the performance of tax revenue. The 
adequate instrument for democracy is an issue almost not addressed in the literature, we therefore propose 
an original instrument,
4 namely the democracy level of the country's neighbours.  
To  preview  our  results,  we  find  that  the  level  of  democracy  is  of  importance  in  explaining  the 
differences in domestic tax revenue performances. Our evidence reveals that the level of constraints on the 
executive  seems  to  be  the  driving  force  behind  the  result.  Democratic  institutions  are  particularly 
important in natural resource abundant countries where higher levels of democracy can transform the 
negative influence of the initial presence of natural resource rents on domestic tax revenue into a positive 
one. The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 presents the relationship between the political 
regime and taxation. Section 3 describes our empirical framework. Section 4 presents the results of the 
panel analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2 - Political Regimes and Taxation 
How  might  the  country's  political  regime  influence  its  domestic  tax  performance?  The  economic 
theory highlights some features of political regimes that might be of importance for the enhanced domestic 
tax mobilization. First of all, representation is critical since the economic reforms implemented depends on 
who  controls  the  political  office.  Indeed,  Acemoglu  and  Robinson  (2006)  model  autocracy  as  a 
dictatorship of the rich and democracy as a dictatorship of the poor or middle classes. As the rich are 
acting  against  redistribution  and  therefore  against  taxation,  less  reforms  to  increase  taxes  should  be 
implemented in an autocracy. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) confirm this idea in their model by predicting 
that in societies where the choice of policy is determined by the median voter theorem, as in democracies, 
and where a large proportion of population does not have access to capital, there will be a strong demand 
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for  taxation.  This  corresponds  particularly  to  developing  countries  where  the  median  voter's  share  of 
capital income (relative to his labour income) is low, thus his ideal tax is high. Mitra et al. (2002), using 
Turkish industry-level data, found that the government's weight on welfare, compared to the weight on 
lobbies’ contributions, is generally higher for democratic regimes than for dictatorships. Drawing on these 
predictions, it can be hypothesized that democracies might take more into account the social welfare and 
be characterized by larger tax reforms, taking the form of higher taxation, to mobilize more revenue for 
redistributive policies. Secondly, the accountability structures might also be different according to the 
political regime. In democracies, the level of constraints on both executive and legislative powers should 
be  greater  since  they  demand  accountability  to  a  broad  set  of  citizens  at  regular  intervals  whereas 
dictatorships are mainly accountable to a smaller group such as the military. Less accountability structures 
give more latitude for decision makers to respond to special interests.
5 Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) 
show that the impact of institutions on economic outcomes depends on the interaction between de jure 
political power, whose allocation is determined by political institutions, and de facto political power, 
which is determined by the equilibrium investments and organizations of different groups. In democracy, 
the balance of de jure power is tilted toward the citizens, while in nondemocracy the elite have greater de 
jure power. If the elite is able to garner sufficient de facto political power in democracy, the equilibrium 
probability  of  pro-elite  institutions  may  be  higher  in  democracy  than  in  nondemocracy.  However,  if 
democracy creates a substantial advantage in favour of the citizens, it may destroy the incentives of the 
elite  to  engage  in  activities  that  increase  its  de  facto  power.  Therefore,  democracies  with  specific 
constraints structures, effective checks and balances, can decrease the incentives of the elite to engage in 
this kind of activities. 
In both two distinctive features between a democracy and an autocracy, interest groups play a crucial 
role.  The  formation  and  influence  of  these  interest  groups  have  been  widely  studied.  Olson  (1982) 
postulates a theory where groups are associated with an inefficient allocation of resources because the 
market power of those organized into groups will be exerted at the expense of others. The rising number of 
rent-seekers in democracy generates an increased competition leading to a crowding effect, the rents per 
rent-seeker falling (Mohtadi and Roe, 2003). In their model, Grossman and Helpman (1994) confirm this 
idea showing that, even with a government "for sale", the balance of countervailing special-interest forces 
                                                 
5 In Morocco, the Value Added Tax, implemented in 1986, still generates insufficient revenues to counter the 
decrease of tariffs revenues because of its complexity and the numerous exemptions that were granted in 
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might lead to the socially optimal policy. The worst situation in this regard is one where some special 
interests  are  able  to  influence  policy  with  no  counter  power.  Thus,  the  multiplication  of  lobby  in 
democracies, seeking conflicting policy objectives, might prevent the severe policy distortions that would 
arise if only one lobby had exclusive influence over the incumbent politician. 
Given these theoretical predictions, democracies should be more able than autocracies to implement 
tax  reforms,  taking  the  form  of  higher  domestic  tax  revenues.  Indeed,  they  should  implement  more 
redistributive policies and less respond to special interests, by enacting fewer specific tax exemptions 
detrimental to public revenues. 
 
3 -The Empirical Framework 
To estimate the influence of the political regime on domestic tax revenue, we use a panel data analysis 
for 66 developing countries (see Appendix A). Our period of analysis is 1990-2005. All variables are 
three-year averages, the sub-periods being 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2001 and 2002-2005. 
The basic estimated equation is of the following form: 
it t i it it it u X Democracy xrev Domesticta + + + + + = λ µ δ β α  
where i and t are country and time period indicators respectively, Domestictaxrev is the domestic tax 
revenue as part of GDP composed of direct taxes (taxes on income and profit) and domestic indirect taxes 
(value-added/sales taxes and excises), Democracy is the measure of democracy and the vector X captures 
other explanatory variables, discussed further below, affecting the domestic tax ratio. The term  i µ  is a 
country-specific effect,  t λ  is an unobserved time effect included to rule out results driven by common 
time-varying factors not otherwise included in our model and uit   is an unobserved random error term. 
 
3.1 Data Sources and Statistics 
Reliable data on domestic tax revenues in developing countries are relatively scarce. Our data are 
based on the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) produced by the IMF and completed by the Article IV 
data. They are collected during IMF's periodic consultations with member countries and are therefore 
more trustworthy. A major difficulty is that what is recorded as international trade taxes often also include 
value-added taxes and excises collected at the border leading to an underestimation of the domestic tax 
revenue. This flaw has progressively been corrected and, since 1990, the distinction is generally correctly 
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1990. We  use a  variety  of  variables  to  capture  the  level  of  democracy.  Firstly,  we  employ  Freedom 
House's ranking of countries with respect to their political rights. This survey provides a yearly measure, 
named political rights, of the degree to which individuals have control over those who govern. Secondly, 
the Polity IV project examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing 
institutions. We use the Polity2 variable which captures the regime authority spectrum from hereditary 
monarchies  to  consolidated  democracies  and  two  component  variables  that  record  key  qualities  of 
constraints on executive authority and political competition. All these variables were normalized so that 
they range between zero (autocracy) and unity (full democracy). Thirdly, in order to show that our results 
are not sensitive to the choice of the democracy measure, we use as alternative indicator, the dichotomous 
regime classification from the recent dataset Democracy-Dictatorship extended by Cheibub et al. (2009). 
The democracy dummy takes the value of 1 if the country is a democracy and 0 otherwise. 
Drawing on the empirical literature that models the share of tax revenues in GDP (Adam et al., 2001; 
Khattry and Rao, 2002; Keen and Lockwood, 2009), we include the following variables as control. The 
GDP per capita is a proxy for overall development, higher level of per capita income is usually found to be 
positively related to domestic tax revenues. The structure of the economy is both measured by the share of 
agriculture  in  GDP  usually  negatively  associated  with  domestic  tax  revenues  and  by  the  degree  of 
urbanization which is expected to have a positive impact on domestic tax revenues. The level of imports 
should be positively associated with domestic tax performance given that, in developing countries, a large 
part of the VAT collected is levied on imports. Higher inflation is supposed to reduce domestic tax yields 
according to the Tanzi-Olivera effect. The relationship between aid per capita and tax revenue is uncertain 
and might depend on the purposes of aid. Demographic variables are included, the proportion of the 
population over 65 years and the share under 14 years old, the tax ratio usually being increasing with the 
number of dependent. All these variables are from the World Development Indicator (WDI) database. 
Finally, we introduce the measures of bureaucracy quality and of corruption compiled by the Political Risk 
Services Group (ICRG) and rescaled from 0 to 1. Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B. 
 
3.2 The econometric issues 
Given the persistence of domestic tax revenues, there is a suspicion of serial correlation which is 
confirmed by a Wooldridge test. To correct for it, we can either include the lagged dependent variable and 
estimate the model with the generalized method-of-moments (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond 
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autoregressive (Gupta, 2007). We will use the latter solution in our estimations since we are not interested 
in distinguishing the short term effects from the long term ones. A concern may also arise about the 
endogeneity of democracy with tax performance. One can argue that the relationship between democracy 
and tax revenue is unlikely to be unidirectional for two reasons. Firstly, a higher level of taxes might be 
needed  to  invest  and  build  expensive  democratic  institutions.  Secondly,  the  Tilly  (1975)  hypothesis 
postulating that citizens are provoked into scrutiny by taxation, was tested empirically by Ross (2004) who 
finds that the larger the share of government expenditure financed through taxation, the more likely the 
government is to become representative. There is therefore a potential reverse causality from taxes to 
democracy. Ordinary least squares with specific effects estimates are thus likely to be biased. To correct 
this  endogeneity,  we  resort  to  an  instrumental-variable  estimation  with  an  original  instrument  for 
democracy, namely the democracy level of the country's neighbours. The choice of adequate instruments 
for democracy is not widely addressed in the literature. However, following Persson and Tabellini (2009),
6 
it is easily imagined how the experience with democracy in foreign, neighbouring countries could spill 
over into greater domestic appreciation of democracy and greater willingness to defend these values. Thus, 
we create the variable neighbouring democratic capital to measure a country's "closeness to democracy", 
given  the  incidence  of  democracy  in  neighbouring  countries.  Specifically,  for  the  country  i  with  ni 













This variable is constructed for each of our democracy  measures, namely NPoliticalRights, NPolity2, 
NDummyDemo, NPoliticalcompetition and NExecutiveconstrainsts. The first stage regressions will be 
presented in order to check whether our instrument is significantly related to democracy. 
 
4 - Results 
In this section, we will firstly examine whether the political regime has an impact on domestic tax 
mobilization. Secondly, we test which aspect of the political regime is crucial to reach higher domestic tax 
revenues and relate this result to the presence of various interest groups. Lastly, we investigate in which 
countries the positive effect a certain kind of political regime might be especially necessary. 
 
                                                 
6 Persson and Tabellini (2009) use a weighting matrix of the distance between all countries whereas we deviate 
slightly by considering only the neighbouring countries with a weighting matrix taking the value of 1 if two 
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4.1 The influence of the political regime on domestic tax revenues 
Estimations of the influence of the political regime on domestic tax ratio are reported in Table 1 for 
our first measure of democracy, Polity2. The fourth column shows the results of the instrumental variable 
regression with random effects (the Hausman test did not reject the null hypothesis that the random effects 
model is consistent and efficient) corrected for first-order autocorrelation of a basic tax effort equation 
with only few control variables. These results, corrected for endogeneity, suggest a positive and significant 
effect of the level of democracy on the domestic tax revenues as part of GDP. The results of the associated 
first stage equation in column 1 indicate support for the validity of our instrument, the level of democracy 
in the neighbourhood being a highly significant determinant of democracy. 
 
Table 1: Influence of democracy on domestic tax revenues (%GDP) 
 
VARIABLES  Polity2 First Stage  Domestic tax rev. (%GDP) 
IV AR(1) correction 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Polity 2        6.110**  7.228**  9.568*** 
        (2.604)  (3.028)  (3.374) 
GDP capita (log)  0.0116  -0.138***  0.018  0.376  0.737  0.494 
  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.0474)  (0.684)  (0.913)  (0.936) 
Imports (%GDP)  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.0007  0.0367**  0.0494***  0.0669*** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.001)  (0.017)  (0.0166)  (0.021) 
Agriculture (%GDP)  -0.001  -0.004**  0.00008  -0.0646*  -0.042  -0.0345 
  (0.0017)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.034)  (0.0363)  (0.041) 
Inflation (log)    -0.025  -0.008    -0.077  -0.131 
    (0.016)  (0.0202)    (0.204)  (0.224) 
Urbanization    0.0031**  -0.0029*    -0.0284  -0.044 
    (0.0013)  (0.0017)    (0.035)  (0.038) 
Population sup 65    -0.044***  -0.0409**    0.957***  1.142*** 
    (0.015)  (0.0189)    (0.325)  (0.369) 
Population inf 14    -0.025***  -0.027***    0.286**  0.333** 
    (0.005)  (0.006)    (0.116)  (0.135) 
Aid capita (log)      0.051      0.427 
      (0.0386)      (0.596) 
Corruption      -0.261*      3.130* 
      (0.143)      (1.811) 
Bureaucracy Quality      -0.108      3.690*** 
      (0.094)      (1.315) 
Npolity2  0.522***  0.434***  0.435***       
  (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.088)       
             
Observations        277  252  197 
Nb of countries        66  61  48 
Hausman Test (p-val)        0.929  0.1656  0.4038 
R-squared  0.209  0.297  0.313  0.2076  0.2279  0.3244 
Robust  standards  errors  in  brackets.  ***p-value<0.01,  **p-value<0.05,  *p-value>0.1.  Constant  and  time  fixed  effect 
included. 
 
After introducing the level of inflation, the two demographic variables and the degree of urbanization 
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additional control variables, the coefficient of democracy remains strongly positive and significant at 1 
percent. With the last specification, an increase of one standard error in the democracy index permits a rise 
of 9.568*0.287=2.75 percentage points in the domestic tax revenue as part of GDP. For the mean level of 
domestic tax revenue in our sample, 9.86% of GDP, this corresponds to a non negligible rise of about 
25%. A number of regularities among the control variables emerge. As expected, the imports as share of 
GDP are positively and significantly related to domestic tax revenues and a higher bureaucracy quality 
leads to significantly higher domestic taxes. The level of corruption is positively related to domestic tax 
revenues and this can either be due to the “grease the wheel” hypothesis (Huntington, 1968) that in 
an inefficient bureaucratie, some grease is needed to circumvent inefficiencies or be due to the 
endogeneity of the corruption variable with tax revenues. The proportions of dependent in the population 
(people above 65 and under 14) are significantly associated to the domestic tax revenues. Lastly, the 
coefficients of the level of per capita GDP and of the agricultural sector share are negative though non 
significant.  
 
In  order  to  corroborate  our  results  and  check  whether  they  are  robust,  whatever  the  democracy 
indicator used, we present the results with two additional alternative measures for democracy using the 
instrumental variable estimator with our last specification of Table 1. In column 2 of Table 2, we present 
the results with the Political Rights indicator. The coefficient of democracy remains significantly positive 
and  of  similar  magnitude  than  with  the  Polity2  measure.  The  corresponding  instrument, 
NeighbourPoliticalRights, is statistically significant, at one percent, in the first stage equation (column 1). 
In  column  4,  the  democracy  index  is  a  discrete  measure  extracted  from  the  Democracy-Dictatorship 
dataset. The instrument for the democracy dummy is statistically significant in the first stage equation and 
can therefore be considered as valid. The 2SLS estimates corrected for first-order autocorrelation, with the 
democracy  dummy,  corroborate  the  result  that  more  democratic  regimes  are  able  to  achieve  higher 
domestic tax revenues hypothetically because they are able to accommodate political economy factors and 
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Table 2: Robustness – Influence of democracy on domestic tax revenues (%GDP) 
 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Political Rights    10.73**     
    (4.688)     
Democracy Dummy        5.411* 
        (2.962) 
GDP capita (log)  0.00803  0.446  -0.0228  0.881 
  (0.0410)  (0.870)  (0.0724)  (0.818) 
Imports (%GDP)  -0.000815  0.0756***  -0.00176  0.0829*** 
  (0.00113)  (0.0213)  (0.00203)  (0.0211) 
Agriculture (%GDP)  -0.00178  -0.0162  -0.000274  -0.0132 
  (0.00219)  (0.0401)  (0.00381)  (0.0353) 
Inflation (log)  -0.0104  -0.0949  -0.00627  -0.161 
  (0.0200)  (0.221)  (0.0345)  (0.211) 
Urbanization  -0.00350**  -0.0161  -0.00151  -0.0375 
  (0.00159)  (0.0383)  (0.00262)  (0.0335) 
Population sup 65  -0.0216  1.089***  -0.0134  0.833*** 
  (0.0183)  (0.328)  (0.0332)  (0.314) 
Population inf 14  -0.0208***  0.372***  -0.0301***  0.303*** 
  (0.00572)  (0.128)  (0.0101)  (0.117) 
Aid capita (log)  0.125***  -0.401  -0.0446  1.136** 
  (0.0373)  (0.813)  (0.0651)  (0.541) 
Corruption  -0.166  3.040*  -0.376  2.914 
  (0.138)  (1.743)  (0.235)  (1.772) 
Bureaucracy Quality  -0.00171  3.073**  -0.0922  2.857*** 
  (0.0921)  (1.223)  (0.163)  (1.106) 
NPoliticalRights  0.309***       
  (0.0782)       
NDemocracyDummy      0.295***   
      (0.0882)   
Observations    210    229 
Number of countries    51    55 
Hausman Test (p-val.)      0.9492  0.9897 
R-squared  0.246  0.2879  0.196  0.2367 




Another concern is whether this positive effect of democracy on domestic taxes is not solely due to a 
better quality of public spending in democracies which could enhance the citizen's tax morale, leading to 
an increased tax mobilization. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) shows that higher public spending quality 
can  be  achieved  only  when  good  governance  is  present,  because  low  levels  of  corruption  and  good 
bureaucracy quality are necessary to ensure the development effectiveness of public spending.
7 Therefore, 
the two control variables, bureaucracy quality and level of corruption, already in our estimations, permit to 
ensure  that  our  result  of  democracies  having  higher  domestic  tax  mobilization  is  not  only  due  to  an 
enhanced quality of public expenditure under democratic regimes but might also come from the fact that, 
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as developed in the theoretical part, democracies are more social welfare oriented and respond less to 
private interests. We will now investigate this issue by distinguishing the different components of the 
democracy measure. 
 
4.2 What matters in democracy for increased domestic tax revenues? 
 
It is interesting to know which aspect of democracy is the driving force behind the result of increased 
domestic  tax  collection  in  more  democratic  regimes.  We  explore  this  issue  in  Table  3  by  using  two 
component measures of the Polity2 index that might be of importance, namely Political Competition and 
Constraints on Executive. The variable Political Competition represents the extent of competitiveness in 
political  participation  whereas  the  Executive  Constraints  variable  assesses  the  extent  of  institutional 
constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive. Limits on the chief executive may be 
imposed by any "accountability group" present in the political regime. If our hypothesis of autocracies 
being less welfare  minded, since they tend to respond more  to special interest groups who seek less 
domestic taxation, is valid, it might be particularly high levels of executive constraints that could limit the 
possibility for the governments to cave in for special interests. In table 3, we test the impact of both 
component  of  democracy  to  assess  whether  one  aspect  of  democracy  is  predominantly  important  to 
achieve higher domestic tax mobilization. Column 1 and 3 present the first stage regressions of the two 
endogenous variables, in which the validity of our instrument is confirmed. In the second and fourth 
columns, the results of the second stage estimation corrected for first-order autocorrelation are reported. 
The level of constraints on the executive impacts significantly the domestic tax performance whereas 
column 4 reveals  that the level of political competition has a statistically non significant impoact on 
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Table 3: Influence of democracy’s components on domestic tax revenue (%GDP) 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Executive Constraints    6.883**     
    (2.858)     
Political Competition        14.11 
        (9.465) 
GDP capita (log)  0.0744  0.000804  0.0489  -0.138 
  (0.0566)  (0.978)  (0.0504)  (1.068) 
Imports (%GDP)  -0.000713  0.0903***  -0.00145  0.102*** 
  (0.00160)  (0.0254)  (0.00139)  (0.0268) 
Agriculture (%GDP)  0.00514  -0.0898*  -7.69e-05  -0.0602 
  (0.00317)  (0.0505)  (0.00277)  (0.0490) 
Inflation (log)  0.0106  0.0457  0.0194  -0.118 
  (0.0265)  (0.280)  (0.0234)  (0.353) 
Urbanization  -0.00322  -0.0243  -0.00313*  -0.00903 
  (0.00200)  (0.0374)  (0.00183)  (0.0421) 
Population sup 65  -0.0508**  1.088***  -0.0320  1.261*** 
  (0.0222)  (0.386)  (0.0198)  (0.471) 
Population inf 14  -0.0307***  0.347**  -0.0195***  0.409* 
  (0.00749)  (0.150)  (0.00649)  (0.213) 
Aid capita (log)  0.0615  0.655  0.0867**  -0.222 
  (0.0451)  (0.670)  (0.0401)  (1.073) 
Corruption  -0.349**  2.083  -0.232  2.233 
  (0.174)  (2.266)  (0.156)  (2.792) 
Bureaucracy Quality  -0.00886  3.341**  -0.117  5.241*** 
  (0.114)  (1.546)  (0.103)  (1.905) 
NExecutiveConstraints  0.492***       
  (0.0974)       
NPoliticalCompetition      0.169**   
      (0.0843)   
Observations    157    157 
Number of countries    45    45 
R-squared  0.364  0.4157  0.242  0.4163 




One may conclude that the level of executive constraints in a country is really of significantly great 
importance for enhanced domestic tax mobilization. The reason is probably that they constrain policy 
makers  to  take  more  into  account  the  social  welfare  in  their  decision  making  process,  through 
redistributive taxation and less favours accorded to various interest groups.  
 
4.3 Where can the positive effects of democracy be especially needed? 
Since we identified a positive effect of the democracy on domestic taxes, one may wonder in which 
countries this positive effect of democracy will especially be needed? The abundance of natural resource 
rents as part of GDP is expected to be an impediment to tax mobilization. Indeed, the availability of high 
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induced governments to implement substantial domestic tax reforms. In their model, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2009) show that the abundance of natural resources might be detrimental to tax mobilization probably 
both because higher rents are creating lower incentives for governments to mobilize tax revenue and 
because governments of oil-rich countries consciously set low tax rates so as not to provoke scrutiny of the 
natural  resource  revenues.  The  measure  of  natural  resource  rents  is  calculated  using  environmental 
economic data from the World Bank which includes costs of production and world prices. Higher levels of 
democracy might induce resource-rich governments to undergo through substantial tax reforms to create a 
sustainable tax system. In presence of an efficient tax system, natural resource rents can contribute to 
increased tax revenues both through direct profit taxation and through increased VAT revenues. We test 
this assumption in Table 4 by introducing an interactive variable between the democracy measure and the 
initial natural resource rents (INatRes). Results with the 2SLS estimator are presented for two measures of 
democracy,  the  Polity2  index  and  the  component  that  was  found  of  importance  to  increase  tax 
mobilization,  the  level  of  constraints  on  the  executive.  We  instrument  both  the  democracy  and  the 
weighted variable INatRes*Democracy (see in columns 1,2 and 4,5 the first stage equations). Across all 
specifications, the initial natural resource rents variable is negative and significant whereas the weighted 
variable (Initial Natural Resource Rents * Democracy) is significantly positive. Consequently, for a given 
level of natural resources, sufficiently high levels of democracy and of constraints on the executive can 
transform the negative impact of the presence of these initial natural resource rents on tax mobilization 
into a beneficial one. This corroborates, but for taxes, the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2009) that for 
higher  growth  achievements  resource-rich  economies  need  a  distinctive  form  of  democracy  with 
particularly strong checks and balances. The coefficient of the democracy variable is positive but non 
significant,  however  the  F-test  of  joint  significance  of  the  two  variables  Democracy  and 
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Table 4: Natural resources influence on domestic tax revenue conditional to democracy levels 
 
VARIABLES  Polity2  INatRes*Polity  DTaxRev  ExConst.  INatRes* 
Exconst 
DTaxRev 
  First Stage  IV AR(1)  First Stage  IV AR(1) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Polity2      3.398       
      (4.263)       
INatRes*Polity      0.698**       
      (0.318)       
ExConstraints            0.919 
            (3.641) 
INatRes*ExConst            0.626*** 
            (0.209) 
INatRes  0.0064  0.276***  -0.424**  -0.0021  0.0604  -0.336*** 
  (0.006)  (0.078)  (0.194)  (0.006)  (0.073)  (0.122) 
GDP capita (log)  -0.0011  0.760  0.121  -0.001  0.189  -0.119 
  (0.048)  (0.574)  (0.965)  (0.059)  (0.706)  (0.956) 
Imports (%GDP)  -0.0002  -0.014  0.0804***  0.00009  -0.0117  0.102*** 
  (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.022)  (0.0017)  (0.020)  (0.0249) 
Agriculture (%GDP)  0.00037  0.0677**  -0.0897*  -0.0002  0.0236  -0.119** 
  (0.002)  (0.0297)  (0.049)  (0.003)  (0.0387)  (0.05) 
Inflation (log)  0.0006  0.338  -0.328  0.0006  0.280  -0.0820 
  (0.0203)  (0.242)  (0.263)  (0.028)  (0.338)  (0.285) 
Urbanization  -0.00007  -0.0298  -0.023  0.00012  -0.0055  -0.0042 
  (0.002)  (0.0207)  (0.039)  (0.002)  (0.0254)  (0.037) 
Population sup 65  -0.0025  -0.147  1.323***  0.0001  -0.170  1.290*** 
  (0.021)  (0.256)  (0.383)  (0.026)  (0.312)  (0.382) 
Population inf 14  -0.0013  -0.0383  0.389***  0.0003  -0.0099  0.402*** 
  (0.0086)  (0.102)  (0.139)  (0.011)  (0.129)  (0.146) 
Aid capita (log)  0.0097  0.761  -0.078  -0.0046  0.448  0.249 
  (0.045)  (0.532)  (0.696)  (0.0516)  (0.619)  (0.681) 
Corruption  0.0010  -0.329  3.392*  0.0009  -0.857  1.736 
  (0.154)  (1.840)  (1.928)  (0.185)  (2.226)  (2.214) 
Bureaucracy Quality  0.006  1.692  2.839*  -0.0035  0.925  2.942* 
  (0.102)  (1.214)  (1.554)  (0.116)  (1.395)  (1.563) 
Polity2 hat  1.104***  4.818*         
  (0.237)  (2.828)         
INatRes*Polity hat  -0.0119  0.562***         
  (0.011)  (0.134)         
Exconst hat        0.958***  1.631   
        (0.238)  (2.856)   
INatRes*ExConst hat        0.0041  0.901***   
        (0.011)  (0.129)   
Observations      188      155 
Number of countries      46      44 
F-test (p-val)      0.004      0.0004 
R-squared  0.323  0.752  0.3874  0.366  0.721  0.4627 
Robust standards errors in brackets. ***p-value<0.01, **p-value<0.05, *p-value>0.1. Constant and time fixed effect included. 
Following  Wooldridge  (2002),  Polity2  hat  is  the  predicted  dependent  variable  of  a  preliminary  regression: 
Polity2=NPolity2+INatRes+Corrupt+BurQual+GDP+Imports+Aid+Infl+Urb+Pop65+Pop14+Agri+ t λ   
and INatRes*Polity hat is the result of Polity hat * INatRes. These two variables are then used as instrument for our two 
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To explore more deeply the idea of a turning point in the natural resource influence, the threshold of 
democracy  above  which  the  negative  impact  of  natural  resource  rents  on  tax  revenue  disappears  is 
calculated in Table 5. 
Table 5: Turning point in the effect of natural resources rents on domestic taxes 
 












Threshold  Polity2 = 0.607  ExConst = 0.537 
Countries  Bolivia, Ecuador, Mongolia, Namibia, Papua New Guinea,… 
 
The  thresholds  are  higher  than  the  mean  level  of  democracy  in  our  sample.  Among  the  natural 
resource abundant economies, only few are characterized by levels of democracy above the estimated 
threshold but it corresponds, for example, to democratic institutions like the ones in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Mongolia, Papouasia New Guinea or Namibia. In Mongolia, for instance, significant steps have been taken 
to improve procedures and fiscal discipline within governments and noteworthy achievements were made 
in  improving  transparency  (IMF,  2001).  Despite  its  mining  rents  abundance,  Namibia  presents  a 
comparatively high tax revenue/GDP ratio reflecting consequent tax effort undertaken by the government. 
So conditional to sufficiently high levels of democracy, the net influence of natural resources can be 
positive both because governments will not anymore rely solely on these rents but build a sustainable tax 
system where the natural resource sector could be a major contributor to tax revenues. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Little  analytical  or  empirical  works  have  studied  the  importance  of  political  economy  factors,  in 
addition to traditional factors, as determinants of domestic tax revenue performance. However, the only 
slow progresses in domestic tax revenues seen in many developing countries doubtlessly reflect in part the 
power  of  vested  interests.  Using  a  panel  of  66  developing  countries  over  the  period  1990-2005,  we 
estimated the influence of democracy on domestic tax revenues, properly correcting for the endogeneity of 
democracy with an original instrument. We find strong evidence that the political regime in a country does 
influence the extent to which domestic tax reforms are implemented and higher domestic tax revenues 
achieved. The estimated effect of increased democracy on tax revenue is quite large and it is the level of 
constraints on the executive that seems to be the driving force behind the result. Increased checks and 
balances are needed to counter the propensity of governments to cave in for special interests and to be less 
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to  make  natural  resource  rents  contribute  to  higher  domestic  taxes  revenues  and  no  longer  be  an 
impediment to a sustained tax system for financing public goods. These findings highlight the presence of 
political economy factors which seriously need to be taken into consideration in the design of domestic tax 
reforms.  Moreover,  the  results  bear  important  policy  implications  by  showing  which  dimension  of 
democracy,  constraints  on  executive,  could  help  developing  countries  to  achieve  higher  domestic  tax 
mobilization. To counter the influence of various interest groups, policy makers should communicate on 
the consequences of the reform in order to reduce the uncertainty and garner a sufficient number of groups 
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Appendix A - Illustrative List of Countries Used in the Regressions 
 
66 countries: 
Angola,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Bangladesh,  Benin,  Bhutan,  Bolivia,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi, 
Cambodia,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Colombia,  Congo  Rep.,  Djibouti,  
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Honduras, India, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kyrgyz Rep., 
Laos,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Malawi,  Mali,  Moldova,  Mongolia,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Nepal, 
Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Rwanda,  Senegal, 
Sierra  Leone,  Sudan,  Swaziland,  Tajikistan,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Togo,  Tunisia,  Uganda, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Appendix B - Summary statistics 
 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
DomTaxRev  277  9.858  4.645  1.728  24.671 
Political Rights  277  0.414  0.273  0  1 
Polity 2  277  0.536  0.287  0  1 
Democracy Dummy  277  0.371  0.469  0  1 
Political Competition  275  0.455  0.275  0  0.9 
Executive Constraints  273  0.486  0.312  0  1 
GDP capita (log)  277  6.149  0.868  4.675  8.347 
Population sup 65  277  3.933  1.915  2.157  15.481 
Population inf 14  277  41.247  6.457  15.436  51.245 
Aid capita (log)  277  3.925  0.530  2.118  5.391 
Imports (%GDP)  277  40.662  20.043  8.977  124.286 
Agriculture (%GDP)  277  28.040  14.054  3.451  73.831 
Urbanization  277  36.849  18.987  5.98  85.26 
Inflation (log)  252  2.741  0.842  0.094  7.886 
Corruption  209  0.5767  0.143  0.167  1 
Bureaucracy Quality  209  0.389  0.205  0  0.875 
Initial Natural Resources  259  5.731  7.636  0  38.342 
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